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Transforming the Financial System
in Eastern Europe's Emerging Market Economies '
A Proposal for Clean Balance Sheets and an Institutional Transfer
1. The Major Capital Market Deficiencies
In developed market economies, banks and other financial institu-
tions perform a variety of vital tasks:
they mobilise savings and allocate funds to the optimal
uses,
they pool investment risks,
they exploit scale economies in the evaluation and
monitoring of borrowers, and
they match the preferences of lenders and borrowers for
liquidity and for specific term structures of portfolios.
Driven by self-interested owners whose own capital is at risk and
by equally self-interested top managers who care for their
reputation on the market for top executives, the banks exert
financial discipline on their customers.
On paper, the emerging market economies (EMEs for short) have
made substantial progress towards a modern financial system: The
old one-tier system of state banks has been dissolved into a
central bank and a variety of commercial banks at an early stage
1) This paper has benefited from financial support from the EC's
Action for Cooperation in the Field of Economics (ACE) in the
framework of a joint research project on "Reintegration of Poland
into the West European Economy by Internal and External Liberali-
sation" undertaken by the Warsaw World Economy Research Insti-
tute, the Milan SDA Bocconi Institute and the Kiel Institute of
World Economics (Grant No. 9010008-1 P).of the transformation process; ' new commercial banks are being
established; financial intermediation takes place as significant
funds do in fact flow between banks and enterprises and among
enterprises. Nonetheless, the financial systems in the EMEs are
still in disarray. As stock exchanges and securities markets are
in their infancy, banks and firms acting as de-facto banks will
play the pivotal role in financial intermediation for the time
being (Brainard 1991, Saunders and Walter 1991). Unfortunately,
the banks are not up to the task of channelling funds to the most
worthy borrowers (Winiecki 199la,b). Whereas some promising
enterprises suffer from a dearth of funds, some hopeless dudds
continue to receive credits to stay afloat and crowd out other
firms on factor and input markets. A variety of deficiencies
impede a proper financial intermediation:
(1) In the turbulent phase after the abolition of central plan-
ning, little is known about the future prospects and hence the
creditworthiness of enterprises. The pervasive uncertainty
concerns the potential viability of an individual firm relative
to others under given circumstances (specific risk) as well as
the course of economic policy and the path and pattern of eco-
nomic development under any given policy (systemic risks).
(2) Many potential borrowers can offer little collateral, or only
collateral of dubious legal status. Borrowers usually need
collateral to signal their creditworthiness. The problem of
insufficient collateral in the EMEs is compounded by the perva-
sive uncertainty about the value of things that might serve as a
collateral and, possibly, also by the asymmetric distribution of
information about such a value.
2) A two-tier banking system is in place since 1987 in Hungary
and Poland, since 1990 in Czechoslovakia and since 1991 in
Bulgaria and Romania.(3) In a similar vein, many firms have little equity and little
investible funds of their own.
3) Hence, major investments need to
be financed largely by credits. A small downward deviation from
the expected rate of return (which depresses the rate of return
on investment somewhat below the interest rate of the credit)
suffices to consume the little equity of the borrower in many
cases. Whereas the lender would thus bear the major part of any
unexpected losses, he would not participate in any unexpected
gains. To make up for this asymmetry, the lender has to demand a
correspondingly higher interest rate.
(4) As the banks are almost exclusively state-owned-, they have
little incentive to act as prudent advocates of capital, be it
their own capital or that of their depositors. Furthermore, the
market for managers is underdeveloped. And because many bank
managers may justly assume that they will be replaced by younger,
better trained or politically untainted newcomers in the future
anyhow, they have little reason to care for their professional
reputation. Instead, it is rational for them to discard the
long-run impacts of their actions and to concentrate on short-run
measures and accounting tricks to make their banks look artifi-
cially healthy on paper - and hence to enhance their own chance
of escaping closer attention for the time being.
(5) Threatening banks with bankruptcy to improve their perfor-
mance is hardly credible; the expectation that government would
have to bail out the banks anyhow is well entrenched. Bank
failures on a substantial scale could undermine whatever con-
fidence the public already has in the nascent financial market
(Hinds ,1990, p. 99). And politically, governments have little
choice but to stand in for existing deposits as the depositors
3) Furthermore, the distribution of investible funds among firms
is arbitrary. This reflects the distortions in the EMEs which
cause an exceptionally low congruence between the ultimate
viability of a firm and its present cash flow.t
mostly did not even have a choice of banks when they opened their
accounts in socialist times.
(6) Bankers often do not possess the necessary skills and exper-
tise .
(7) The emerging market economies lack a well-established and
well-tested system of prudential regulation and supervision.
Recounting rules and practices to not yet conform to accounting
procedures in the West. Prudent accounting is likely to reveal
that not only a few institutes of negligible importance but a
major part of the banks have a net value that is negative.
(8) Specific banks and firms are tied to each other in various
ways which impede competition between banks and grossly distort
financial flows. To facilitate financial control under central
planning, firms had been forced to deal almost exclusively with a
specific bank while banks had been specialised towards serving
enterprises in a specific branch or region. As a legacy of this
past, the portfolios of many commercial banks are highly concen-
trated. These banks become hostage to their dominant customers on
whose willingness or ability to pay the fate of the individual
bank depends (Hinds 1990, pp. 133, 147). Out of pure self-inter-
est, the banks tend to channel fresh money to their dominant
customers and not to more promising potential borrowers.
(9) Banks have inherited a heavy burden of bad loans to state
enterprises. Neither banks nor firms are to blame for that sorry
state of affairs: both had little financial discretion in the
past anyhow, central decisions on finance and investment were
unrelated to profitability, and the past set of relative prices
differed radically from the present one so that whatever rudimen-
tary calculations of investment viability and hence creditworthi-
ness may have been made in the past are obsolete anyhow. To
postpone the moment of truth when losses on bad loans have to be
written off in their own books, banks let fresh money follow the
bad loans: they refinance existing obligations and provide new
credits to cover the interest due (see i.a. Brainard 19 91, p.97). Betting on an eventual government bail out of insolvent
firms may also be a cause of this malpractice.
(10) The portfolio problem consists not only of loans that are
not being serviced at all; it is also unclear which further loans
will eventually turn out to be unrecoverable. Furthermore, in
socialist times banks had granted sizeable amounts of long term
credits at extremely low interest rates fixed in nominal terms.
Due to inflation and some financial liberalisation, the bank's
present nominal costs of refunding are far above these old
lending rates. Hence, banks lose sizeable amounts of money even
on loans that are fully serviced (see i.a. Hinds 1990, Annex 2).
To stay solvent nonetheless, banks would have to charge new
customers excessive interest rates. The likely result is a slow
process of adverse selection, with borrowers turning increasingly
to new banks or to those old banks which by chance have inherited
4 ) a comparatively clean portfolio. '
(11) Apart from portfolio concentration and bad loans, the
personal contacts established in the days when there was little
or no choice of business partners are a third factor which links
banks to specific firms (see also Winiecki 1991a). To some
extent, favouring clients whose top managers a banker has known
for a long time is quite rational: in the turbulent transforma-
tion period in which even the best calculations of viability are
frought with problems, in which law•enforcement is uncertain, in
which collateral, is hard to come by and in which informational
asymmetries abound, it helps to know from experience whether
one's partner tends to honour contracts or not. ' In the peculiar
4) A particularly complex problem are the low interest mortgage
loans from state banks to private borrowers; a discussion of this
issue, which cannot be solved simply within the state sector, is
beyond the scope of this paper; see for instance Blue Ribbon
Commission 1990.
5) -Information between long-standing chums is distributed less
asymmetrically than between strangers. The partners know each
Fprts . Fu|3notesituation of the EMEs however, such systematic favouritism also
reflects a perverse system of mutual insurance: Trusting each
other and trying to keep their old cosy jobs for as long as
possible, bankers and firm managers try to bail each other out to
avoid bankruptcy proceedings and other kinds of outside scrutiny;
they collaborate to cook the books and to channel financial flows
so that both the bank and the firms look sufficiently healthy on
p&per for the time being.
(12) The financial links between firms and their banks are
similar to those among firms. Personal contacts, dependence on a
dominant supplier or outlet, neglect of the long-term capital
value of the state-owned firm, a reluctance to initiate bank-
ruptcy proceedings against, other firms and possibly also the
expectation of an eventual government bail out are major factors
which prompt many of the more liquid firms to extend inter-firm
credit to less liquid ones (see Dabrowski et al. 1991). Inciden-
tally, the links between firms and the network of inter-firm
credits of dubious quality further complicate the task of asses-
sing the solvency of firms.
Whereas the actual capital market is underdeveloped in the
emerging market economies, the need for efficient financial
intermediation during the transformation process is even far
greater than in a mature market economy: The large-scale privati-
sation of state property, the need for substantial restructuring
of firms and the comparatively great role which new
1firms play in
the transformation process put above-average strains on the
capital market.
By their very nature, some of the capital market problems cannot
be completely resolved by economic policy. The pervasive uncer-
tainty in the early phases of the transformation process will not
vanish completely for quite some time; it can at best be
Forts . FuJ3note
other's reputation and can comparatively easily inform themselves
about each other's activities.mitigated by appropriate policies. Other problems can be better
adressed. The following sections deal with three major issues,
namely (i) the issue of old loans, (ii) suitable ways to speed up
the establishment of an appropriate regulatory framework as well
as the development of the banking sector and the transfer of
know-how from abroad, and (iii) possible strategies to counteract
the collateral gap. Finally, the role of financial reform in the
•Riming and sequencing of the transformation process is discussed.
2. Cleaning the Balance Sheets for a Fresh Start
a. The problem of old debt
The network of old loans between banks and firms is one of the
most pressing problems for the emerging market economies. The
consequences which this particular legacy has for firms are bad
enough: the debt burden is distributed arbitrarily between firms,
a firms's debt is unrelated to the value of its assets; by pure
chance, many unviable firms carry a comparatively light debt and
hence enjoy an unwarranted competitive edge over other firms
while more promising but less lucky enterprises collapse under
the burden of debt service. The privatisation of firms is compli-
cated and delayed by the need to identify and deal with the bad
loans; the restructuring of the economy is deferred because banks
are reluctant to initiate bankruptcy proceedings against those
loss-making firms which are their dominant clients. The conse-
quences for banks and hence for financial intermediation are even
worse: Scarce new funds are wasted to postpone the bankruptcy of
unviable firms. The bad loans - and the uncertainty about the
extent of the problem and the future fate of the dubious loans -
also impede the privatisation of existing banks. In the same
vein, they make it much more difficult politically to open the
national financial system to foreign banks. Thanks to their freshstart, outsiders would enjoy a clear competitive advantage over
the local banks with troubled portfolios. '
b. The logic of cancelling old debt
The legacy of old debts necessitates a financial restructuring of
both state firms and state banks. In the literature, a virtual
7 \
consensus has evolved on three aspects of a solution: ' the old-
,debt link between firms and banks has to be cut, at least part of
the old debt has to be taken from the books of the banks, and the
banks need to be recapitalized by an infusion of funds from the
state budget in the form of long-term bonds with positive real
rates of interest. Two serious questions remain:,
(i) Should the respective loans be written off, i.e. be removed
from the balance sheets of the debtor firms as well, or does
it suffice to let the banks off the hook? In this case, the
liabilities of firms need not be cancelled. Instead, they
could be transferred from the banks to some other institu-
tion.
(ii) Should all loans incurred under the old regime or only the
supposedly bad ones be affected?
In his seminal paper, Manuel Hinds (199 0) has proposed a solution
which many other authors have endorsed in principle: After some
audit of the books of firms and banks, government should purchase
only the problem loans from banks. These loans should not be
cancelled; instead, some institution should try to recover the
outstanding amount as best as it can from the debtor firms. The
institution, which would be paid by government for the task,
6) World Bank 1991, Annex 4, p. 6. In this respect, Poland's
attempt at "twinning" its local banks with foreign ones is in
principle laudable; however, it may deter foreign banks if they
have to bear the risks of old debt.
7) See for instance Calvo and Frenkel (1991), Hinds (1990),
Brainard (1991), Hrncir and Klacek (1991) Saunders and Walter
(1991), The World Bank (1991), Manasian (1991).could be the respective bank itself (Hinds 1990, p. 75) or a
special government fund (Brainard 1991).
Building on Hinds, Brainard advocates a comparatively restrictive
approach: He proposes in-depth audits using Western accounting
methodology that permit governments to rank enterprises and bank
loans from best to worst as a precondition for cleaner balance
sheets. Furthermore, firms' access to new credits should be tied
to the servicing of old loans according to their ability (Brai-
nard 1991, p. 106).
The more radical alternative would be to write off all old debt
completely so that both banks and firms could start with a clean
slate. In comparison with this clean sweep, which has been
proposed at an early stage for East Germany (Schmieding 1990),
the more restrictive approach outlined above has a number of
serious disadvantages:
(1) It addresses merely one aspect of the problem. Only the
state banks are relieved of the debt burden. For state
firms, the uncertainties and competitive distortions which
8) arise from the old liabilities persist. '
(2) Given the uncertainty about the future viability of indivi-
dual firms and the pervasive linkages between firms, the
audits may yield little hard information on the ability of
8) One aspect of the East German example is quite instructive in
this respect: In the summer of 1990, financial intermediaries in
East Germany could start into the German currency union with
clean balance sheets. Two West German commercial banks took over
the branches and the staff of the former East German state bank
while all old liabilities were transferred to a special fund;
newly established banks were by definition unaffected by old
debt. Nonetheless, the old debt of firms continued to aggravate
the operations of the "clean" banks. The debt was not cancelled,
instead its final fate was to be determined on a case-by-case
basis upon the privatisation of the respective firm. The unresol-
ved debt problem of firms added to the difficulties of banks to
assess the creditworthiness of firms and increased the uncertain-
ty about what the firms could provide as collateral for new loans
(World Bank 1991, Annex 4).10
firms to serve and repay their inherited debt; the classifi-
cation of loans into "good" and "dubious" ones may mean
little.
(3) Thorough audits of balance sheets of firms take considerable
time. As the banks have to carry the old loans until the
respective audit has identified the dubious ones, the
process of restructuring the portfolios of the banks and
hence of making the banks better equipped for their tasks in
a market economy is delayed.
(4) The initial audits and the case-by-case work-out of each
dubious loan necessitate a considerable input in terms of
human capital and administrative capacities and capabili-
ties . This runs directly counter to one of the most urgent
priorities for the design of a rational policy strategy in
the emerging market economies: namely to economize on scarce
financial and administrative skills.
(5) The case-to-case approach implies considerable administra-
tive discretion over the treatment of huge financial assets
and liabilities. It thus begets a vast scope for lobbying
and outright corruption.
(6) The attempt to recover dubious loans according to the actual
ability of firms to serve their old debt at any point in
time creates a strong disincentive: Why should firms which
still carry old debt try hard to improve their financial
situation if the fruits'of the endeavour would not benefit
the firms but simply accrue to the institutions which
administer the old loans?
c. Objections against a clean sweep
Because of the above arguments, a complete write-off of all old
debt is the superior option. Nonetheless, governments in the
emerging market economies are very reluctant to simply cancel old
debt (Manasian 1991, p. 23). There are two serious objections:
(i) the danger of creating an unwarranted precedent and (ii) the
supposed costs for the state budget. These objections are consi-
dered in turn.11
(i) The first objection appears quite convincing at first glance:
Debt relief, especially if apparently granted at the expense of
the state, could foster the expectation that government bail-outs
will happen in the future as well. This could induce economic
agents to lend and borrow carelessly, or rather to continue to do
so. However, the objection is beside the point. Substantial funds
have already been wasted, irrevocable losses have been incurred
regardless whether and how they presently show up in the more or
less unaudited books. Hence, major debt write-offs cannot be
avoided anyhow. The real question is whether debt should be
cancelled at one stroke or whether it is preferable to sort out
the loans case-by-case and over the course of time as part of the
bankruptcy proceedings for firms in default and the worst-hit
banks, or as part of the privatisation process.
Waiting for bankruptcies could promise the advantage of stimula-
ting a more efficient behaviour on the part of bank and firm
managers in the meantime. After all, managers may be eager to
ay:pid such a procedure which could well cost them their jobs.
However, bankruptcies of banks are a particularly unpalatable
option for countries in which the nascent financial system enjoys
little public confidence anyhow; and many of the short-term
strategies which managers of state firms adopt to delay
bankruptcy are grossly inefficient, their major effect being to
run-down the remaining capital value of the firm. And advocating
bankruptcy as a convenient way to get rid of old managers is not
very convincing as the privatisation of firms offers such an
opportunity anyhow.
Shying away from an immediate write-off postpones the solution of
the debt problem. It retards the restructuring of firms and banks
and contributes to a continuing waste of fresh financial funds.
Furthermore, it gives rise to a severe disincentive effect:
Knowing that they have no other way of cleaning the books of
their firms, managers may willingly steer their firms into
bankruptcy, if need be by shifting selected assets to newly
registered companies and deliberatedly mismanaging the remaining
assets until the old enterprise collapses (Manasian 1991, p. 24).12
(ii) The need for the state to recapitalize the banks after debt
cancellation appears to place a burden on the state budget.
However, appearances may deceive. The debt relief has no direct
effect on the net asset position of the state. It merely clari-
fies the distribution of assets and liabilities within the state
sector: the value of state firms rises by the amount of erased
liabilities; within the balance sheets of state banks, the claims
on state firms are converted into claims on government. In a
proper account of public wealth, the government liabilities to
banks would be offset by the increase in the net value of state
firms. Upon the sale of state firms-, government recoups the
equivalent of the cancelled debt in the form of higher privatisa-
tion revenues. As to the current budget of the state, only the
time profile of outlays but not their amount is directly affected
by the choice of methods. In the case of a debt write-off, the
budget has to bear the annual interest payments on the reca-
pitalization bonds for banks; in the case of a piecemeal and
gradual approach, the state receives less privatisation revenue
than otherwise and has to foot the bill of the debt-caused barik-
9) ' '•
rupties of individual state firms. ' It is not even clear a
priori under which strategy the direct budgetary outlays are more
front-loaded.
However, the two strategies of an immediate clean sweep or a
protracted work-out of the balance sheets of firms differ sub-
stantially in their indirect budgetary effects. This is so for
two reasons: First, a debt write-off removes one important aspect
of uncertainty about the true value of firms and banks. Hence,
risk-averse purchasers of state banks and state firms would be
willing to pay more for them than otherwise. The overall revenues
from privatisation rise by more than the value of the cancelled
loans. Second, and most importantly, a rapid debt write-off
9) Mutatis mutandis, the same arguments apply if only the balance
sheets of state banks and not that of state firms were cleaned.
In this case, not the value of firms but that of state banks
would directly rise by the amount of bad loans taken from their
portfolio.Bibliofrhek
des Institute fur Weltwirtschafc
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facilitates the privatisation of firms, the emergence of an
efficient banking system and a rational allocation of fresh
funds. This solution contributes to widening the tax base via
faster economic growth.
To sum up: removing only the dubious loans from the balance
^sheets of banks as proposed i.a. by Hinds and Brainards promises
.no,-significant gains relative to the radical approach of a clean
,,sweep for banks and firms. Instead, it would imply some serious
disadvantages. Most importantly, it would be costly in terms of
the factors which are among the scarcest of all in the EMES:
namely time, administrative capacities and budget revenues.
Hence, all old debt between banks and firms and among firms that
has been incurred before a certain date should be written off.
Naturally, the state needs to make it clear that debt relief will
not happen again. Making this credible would be much easier in
the case of a decisive break with the past, i.e. a highly visible
and once-off clean sweep, than in a drawn-out process of finan-
cial restructuring. In the latter case, some relief for old debt
will have to be granted for a long time to come. This casts doubt
on government announcements of a tough stance on new debt,
especially as it may get increasingly difficult to disentangle
old and new ^liabilities .
d. Modifications to the radical approach
The resolution of the old-debt issue is complicated by the fact
that, in most emerging market economies, considerable time has
already elapsed since the main steps of microeconomic deregula-
tion (abolition of quantitative central planning, liberalisation
of prices) were taken. Firms have already carried their inherited
debt burden in the new micro-environment for some time; further-
more, the privatisation of state enterprises is already under
way.
Consider the implications of the privatisation progress first:
The standard approach so far has been to cancel a substantial
part of the old loans upon privatisation on a case-by-case basis.14
Changing tack and cancelling all old debt of the firms which are
still state-owned could arouse allegations of unfairness from the
new owners of those already privatised firms who still have part
of the old debt on their books. In principle, the objection is
completely invalid: the conditions of previous privatisation's
reflected what the parties knew about the net value of the firms
(assets minus liabilities); if the firm had been privatised with
less debt, the state could have demanded a correspondingly higher
price (or tougher non-price conditions). Hence, the differential
treatment of old debt for the already and the not-yet privatised
firms does not result in any discrimination.
However, a genuine problem arises if some ownership titles have
been and will continue to be given away to specific groups for
(almost) free. In this case, the previous recipients of such a
gift, say the employees of already privatised firms which still
bear part of their old debt, have indeed obtained less net value
than the corresponding beneficiaries of future privatisations
will receive after debt relief for their firms. For these cases,
special provisions like a further reduction in the old debt
carried by the already privatised firms may be needed for reasons
of political expediency. ' Unfortur
constitute a drag on the state budget.
of political expediency.
 } Unfortunately, this would indeed
This point can be put more comprehensively: If the conditions of
privatisation are not related to the value of the property, i.e.
if ownership titles are given away, it does matter for the public
purse to which extent the value of the gift is increased by debt
relief for the firms. The more property values are given away for
free, the more does the state have to finance its outlays by
corresponding increases in taxes. Nonetheless, the advantages of
10) Note however that the already privatised firms are often
among the few obviously promising ones in the EMEs. Even with
part of the old debt still on their books, these firms may be
worth more than most other firms after debt relief. Hence, the'
case for ex-post changes in the conditions of previous
privatisations is weaker than appears at first glance.15
getting rid of the old-debt problem - including the long-run
increase in the tax base - are likely to outweigh these particu-
lar short-run budgetary costs.
Now consider the implications of the fact that state firms have
already had some time to cope with - or to ignore - their inheri-
ted debt . In Poland for instance, the major steps of deregulation
date back to late 1989 and to January 01, 1990; Czechoslovakia
had followed' suit on January 01, 1991. The state firms have not
exploited their vastly increased scope for autonomous action in a
uniform way. ' Some have struggled to serve and repay their old
debt while others have refused or were' unable to do so, forcing
their banks to add the arrears to the amount of debt outstanding
and to let fresh money follow the bad loans. Simply cancelling
all- old debt would punish the firms who have tried hard to honour
their inherited liabilities relative to those who have not.
To. avoid such an apparent act of unfairness, the debt settlement
should reflect the differential behaviour of firms in the
meantime. First of all, to discriminate old from new debt, a
qualifying date needs to be fixed, preferably the one at which
most markets were liberalized. All firms should be put in a
position as if their debt had been cancelled at that time. Hence,
the firms which served or even repaid old debt thereafter should
be rewarded by a corresponding amount of long-term government
bonds (worth the capitalized present value of the interim debt
service and the repaid capital). Remember that, under normal
circumstances, such an improvement in the asset position of firms
is no drain on the state budget as it directly raises the
privatisation value of these firms.
The case for debt relief is based i.a. on the presumption that
the inter-firm distribution of old debt is not correlated with
11) For an evaluation of the behaviour of Polish state firms
after the "big bang" see Dabrowski et al. (1991) and Jorgenson et
al. (1990).16
the expected profitabibility of the firm; or that, in the present
economic upheaval in the EMEs, it is next to impossible or
prohibitively costly to ascertain whether any such positive
correlation may exist or not. However, some guesses may be
possible. At least in Poland, heavy industry carries a comparati-
vely heavy burden of old debt. ^ At the same time, many econo-
mists predict that heavy industry, i.e. the most-favoured branch
of the estwhile central planners, will be among the branches that
have to shrink most. Debt relief may make it harder for a deter-
mined government to actually force heavy industry into bankruptcy
soon.
However, if their current revenues dp not cover their current
outlays, firms in heavy industry will be a candidate for bank-
ruptcy in the near future anyhow. The argument against debt
relief for branches like heavy industry would only be valid if
the cancellation of old debt (which at present many of these
firms are not serving anyhow) enhances their probability of
getting access to new funds. Private banks that care for their
capital would have no rational incentive to provide such funds
exactly to those industries which are supposed to shrink most.
However, as long as banks are mainly state-owned, such an outcome
cannot be entirely ruled out. On the one hand, cutting the debt
link which used to tie firms to borrowers makes it easier for
banks to refuse fresh money to bad customers; on the other hand,
a state banker can point to the clean balance sheet of a firm
which is managed by an old chum as an excuse to extend a new
credit. Hence, a complete cancellation of old debt even for those
major branches which are supposedly doomed anyhow makes most
sense if it is closely linked to the privatisation of banks.
As long as major banks are still in the hands of the state, two
modifications of the radical proposal for debt relief merit some
discussion:
12) I owe this point to Wojciech Kostrzewa.17
(1) A widespread presumption among politicians holds that the
largest technical units in the EMEs (which are frequently in
heavy industry) are among the least viable. To keep these firms
under strong pressure to adjust or to go bankrupt soon, debt
relief could be restricted and biassed against the big borrowers:
up to a uniform amount per firm, all old debt would be cancelled;
above that threshold, a fixed percentage of the additional old
debt would remain on the books of the firms. The treshold could
be set so high that the majority of firms would still get rid of
all their old debt. To clean the books of the banks, the remai-
ning part of the debt of the big firms should be transferred to
and managed by a special fund. A clear and uniform rule should
specify under which conditions this fund should initiate bank-
ruptcy proceedings against its creditors.
(2) To minimize the scope for inefficient lending by state banks,
a cap should be put on the funds (credit plus equity) which any
firm can receive from state banks. The amount should be tied to
the actual sales revenues of the firm, not to more or less
arbitrary book values of assets. Incidentally, such a rule which
favours private banks would give an impetus to the privatisation
of the banking system. Furthermore, remember that a radical debt
write-off facilitates the privatisation of banks.
e. A scope for debt-equity swaps?
An apparently elegant alternative to a write-off of old-debt
could be debt-equity swaps. Such swaps even seem to deal with two
problems at one stroke: the old debt vanishes upon conversion
into equity held by banks, and correspondingly less ownership
titles in state firms remain to be disbursed to the public during
the privatisation of firms. However, such debt-equity swaps have
serious drawbacks relative to a write-off under the peculiar
circumstances of the EMEs:
(1) In order to determine the conditions for the swaps, the
value of the firm's assets and liabilities need to be
calculated.18
(2) The inherited links between state banks and state firms are
strengthened rather than cut. These links are a major root
of the capital market deficiencies in the EMEs.
(3) Whereas state firms would indeed be liberated from their old
debt, state banks would not be better off. In many cases,
they would simply have exchanged non-performing loans for
equity stakes in loss-making firms.
(4) The state would still need to recapitalize the banks; the
state purse does not save money in this way (see above).
(5) The present banks would be rather unqualified owners. The
banks still are mostly state-owned'and not equipped with the
relevant management expertise. Only if they" were privately-
owned and had such expertise would they indeed have a strong
incentive and the means to monitor the behaviour of the
firms in which they have stakes.
(6) The assortment of ownership stakes in firms of dubious
quality constitutes a burden which complicates a most vital
part of the financial rehabilitation of the EMEs: the
privatisation of the banks.
(7) The privatisation of state firms is not facilitated very
much either. Sizeable ownership stakes that are already held
by a state bank may deter strategic investors who, upon
acquiring a dominant stake in a firm, like to have a major
say in the distribution of the remaining ownership titles as
well.
Despite their apparent elegance, debt-equity swaps are inferior
to a debt write-off in this particular situation.
3. Importing a Banking System from the West
Cleaning the balance sheets of the existing state banks is only
one step towards a mature banking system. It also facilitates the
further major step of privatising the banks. Naturally, these
steps do not suffice to create a sophisticated system of19
financial intermediation. Such a system consists of three major
ingredients:
(1) A legal' framework. This framework encompasses (i) laws on
the financial system, including laws on prudential regula-
tion and supervision, as well as laws on other matters such
as mortgages and other kinds of collateral which are of
paramount importance to standard banking activities, (ii)
the implementation of the rules and laws in practice, and
(iii) the interpretation of the rules and laws in court and
other institutions for the settlement of legal disputes.
(2) Organizations such as the central bank, commercial banks and
other financial institutions.
(3) The skills and experiences of the agents operating the
system.
Some major elements of a modern financial system can be estab-
lished rather easily in the emerging market economies: In prin-
ciple, a few strokes of a pen suffice to pass and enact the
relevant laws and to create the needed organisations, at least on
paper. The other elements of an indigenous financial system have
to evolve over time. However, even the seemingly simple task of
making the laws has been delayed in many EMEs by the desire to
devise an optimal instead of just a workable financial system.
Considerable time has been spent comparing various Western
experiences and discussing which kind of financial system might
best fit the pre-socialist traditions and the post-socialist
peculiarities of the EMEs.
If time were a free good to be utilised without opportunity
costs, such a slow and thorough approach might be appropriate.
However, time is among the scarcest factors of all in the EMEs. A
delay in the establishment of a workable financial system pro-
longs the transformation crisis. On purely economic grounds, it
is dubious whether the discounted future gains from having
finally found a better, design for the local financial market
outweigh the short-run sacrifices of getting that market later.
Politically, time is an even more binding constraint: The longer20
the recovery from the present transformation crisis is delayed by
discussions on optimal approaches to specific problems, the
greater is the hazard that the patience of major parts of the
population will run out. This could jeopardize the entire trans-
formation process. And finally, it is not even clear whether the
quality of the design increases with the length of the discus-
sion. The more local lobbies have time to gather strength, the
more may the result mirror the influence of lobbies on the
process of decision making rather than deeper insights into the
economic logic of alternative arrangements.
Given the time constraint, the EMEs need to ponder more rapid
ways of creating a sophisticated system of financial intermedia-
tion. Fortunately, such systems exist in the West. The very
difference between the rudimentary banking systems in the emer-
ging market economies and the sophisticated ones in the West
gives rise to a twin opportunity: The EMEs do not have to design
and build their own system from scratch if they can import
essential features from the West; and the EMEs are potentially
attractive locations for Western financial institutions because
there is so much scope for better financial intermediation in the
East.
As the emerging market economies are striving to become members
of the EC, their future financial system need to be compatible
with the EC laws and regulations anyhow. The EMEs could save time
and evade a future need for adjusting their nascent financial
system to EC requirements if they opted for an institutional
transfer in the first place: they could copy the basic elements
of the financial system of an EC member (or the system of an EC
non-member which is compatible with the EC requirements).
One part of the institutional transfer is straightforward: the
relevant laws and regulations need to be translated and passed
into local law. However, a legal framework is of limited use
without the relevant skills to operate in it; laws and rules can
be implemented, policed and interpreted differently. For a
wholesale transfer of a Western financial system, the EMEs would21
thus have to go much further and encourage the import of the
organisations, the human capital and the reliability which make a
Western financial systems work smoothly. This would necessitate
the following steps for an EME:
(1) The EME adopts the relevant laws and rules of a Western
country.
(2) It commissions the body which is responsible for the pruden-
tial supervision of the banking system of the respective
Western country to set up a local branch and perform its
task in the EME as well.
(3) In a similar vein, the relevant'- court of appeal of the
Western partner country (or the EC Court of Justice) becomes
the ultimate arbiter on legal disputes in a few banking-
related fields like the law of collateral which the EME has
adopted.
(4) The EME ceases any discrimination between banks owned by
locals and by foreigners; the laws and the system of pruden-
tial regulation are applied to local and to foreign banks
alike.
(5) The EME privatises the existing local banks (with a clean
balance sheet) and invites foreign banks to enter the market
via the acquisition of existing banks or via the establish-
ment of new branches.
The wholesale institutional transfer removes the legal uncertain-
ties for Western banks. In conjunction with the cleaning of the
balance sheets of the existing banks, it constitutes the most
radical way of turning the presently underbanked EMEs into a
promising field of activity of foreign banks. Naturally, a
banking system comparable to that in developed market economies
would not emerge overnight. Even in an optimal institutional
framework, foreign banks are likely to be cautious, perhaps
restricting their net networks of branches to the major cities
initially. The case for a wholesale institutional transfer is not
that this would solve the problems of financial intermediation at
the stroke of a pen. Rather, under the given (and mostly adverse)22
circumstances, this transfer makes it as easy as possible for
Western banks to become active in the EMEs and to transfer and
fully utilise their expertise.
Unfortunately, ascribing a prominent role to foreign banks could
arouse allegations of a "sell-out" to foreigners. The opposite
holds though: a banking system that is being made more efficient
by free access for foreign banks helps to mobilize domestic
savings and to enlarge the supply of credits to local entrepre-
neurs. Hence, foreign banks would actually widen the opportuni-
ties for citizens of the EMEs to establish their own private
business or to purchase state property.'
As the present banking systems in the EC are not identical, it
matters which one the EMEs adopt. Even in the case of a wholesale
institutional transfer, some rough comparisons of the benefits of
the various arrangements need to be made. The most important
difference among the banking systems in the EC concerns the
question whether universal banking is severely restricted (as in
the United Kingdom) or not (as in Germany) . For the peculiar
situation of the EMEs, universal banking is more appropriate than
legal barriers between various banking activities. First of all,
universal banking is the more liberal approach; the worldwide
trend towards a deregulation of financial systems has lowered the
old legal barriers between banking activities in various coun-
tries already. Secondly, universal banking makes it possible for
banks to acquire significant stakes in enterprises. By admitting
a further group of prospective owners, the choice of universal
banking could thus speed up and facilitate the privatisation
process. And thirdly, universal banking makes it easier for
financial intermediaries to finance investments by a mix of
credit and equity. Many firms are undercapitalized and have
little investible funds of their own. To the extent that a bank
provides equity as well as credits, it also participates in
unexpected gains - and not only in the losses as in the case of a
credit-only funding of investments (see above). The risk premium
which the bank needs to charge per unit of credit disbursed would23
be correspondingly lower; the bank has an incentive to provide
more funds than otherwise.
Nonetheless, there are two serious objections against universal
banking: (i) Ownership links between firms and banks can soften
the budget constraint for firms and hence cause inefficiency
(Hinds 1990, p. 132). This objection holds in the short term for
firms which come to own their banks and can deplete the assets of
the bank until the misconduct becomes obvious (or is noted by the
supervisory body) so that the depositors switch to a more prudent
institution. It does not apply to the standard case of universal
banking in which private (!) banks become part-owners of firms.
In this case, banks acquire an even greater interest in the
profitability of the firm than if they had merely extended a
credit, (ii) Banks which own significant stakes in firms may try
to exploit their strong position in the local economy for politi-
13) cal purposes. ' However, such misconduct is less likely if
foreign banks are involved who - unlike fledgling local banks -
would put at risk a well-established reputation on the world
capital market. And if the financial market is completely open
for potential competition, there is little scope for any beha-
viour that is not primarily geared towards economic efficiency
anyway.
4. The Collateral Gap
Even if the radical proposal advanced above was implemented, not
all obstacles to efficient financial intermediation in the EMEs
would be removed. Apart from the high degree of systemic and
firm-specific uncertainty, the major remaining problem would be
that many potential borrowers cannot post sufficient collateral.
13) See Frydman and Rapaczynski 19 91, p. 30, who nonetheless
stress the economic advantages of universal banking for the EMEs.24
a. On the importance of collateral
In a developed financial system, the provision of collateral is a
standard means to counteract a moral hazard on the part of
borrowers and to resolve the twin information problems of (i) a
genuine lack of information on a borrower's ability to serve and
repay a credit and (ii) of an asymmetric distribution of such
information. Banks often cannot discriminate sufficiently between
good and bad risks. The asymmetric distribution of information
leads to a problem of adverse selection: Being unable to charge a
tailor-made risk premium, banks have to ask for an average
premium which subsidises the bad and taxes the good risks. The
• 14) latter are crowded out at the margin. '. Raising the uniform
interest rate "would discourage low-risk borrowers more than
high-risk borrowers, since the latter have a smaller probability
of actually having to pay the higher rate" (Gale 1990, p. 52).
Not only the choice of investment projects but also the subse-
quent behaviour of borrowers can depend on collateral. Suppose
that the success of a project is a positive function of the
investor's effort. The less collateral he has posted, the less
incentive does he have to strive hard to make optimal use of the
funds (moral hazard).
To assess the importance of sufficient collateral, consider a
simple model (Gale 199 0) with risk-neutral economic agents and
suppose that all investment projects for which bank finance is
sought are socially desirable ex ante (the expected return on
investment net of risk of default exceeds the social opportunity
costs). Investors have private information whether their project
is of a low-risk or a high-risk type (both the actual rate of
return in case of success and the risk of default are above those
of low-risk ventures). If lenders charge a rate of interest which
reflects the average risk of default of the projects financed
14) See i.a. Copeland 1988, Keeton 1979, Stiglitz and Weiss 1981,
Bester 1985.25
(pooling equilibrium), they crowd out low-risk projects. Lenders
can get around this problem by using collateral as a sorting
device, ' offering different types of contracts so that
borrowers self-select into the appropriate category: knowing that
their probability of default is small, low-risk lenders opt for a
low interest rate and provide a large amount of collateral;
high-risk lenders prefer a high interest rate without having to
post any collateral because they are aware that their probability
of losing the collateral is comparatively high. The resulting
separating equilibrium is more efficient than the non-collateral
pooling equilibrium. Whereas the outcome is still less efficient
than it would be under symmetric information ', at least all
worthy investment projects are being financed.
However, if the low-risk borrowers have insufficient collateral,
lenders need a further sorting device to make sure that high-risk
borrowers do not masquerade as low-risk ones and hence obtain
unduly cheap credit. Lenders can do so by rationing the low-
interest credit: Taking the limited probability of obtaining the
cheap funds into account, high-risk borrowers are now better off
applying for the unrationed high-interest credit while low-risk
borrowers who cannot afford the high interest rates still seek
only the low-interest funds. As some profitable low-risk
investment projects are not financed due to the rationing of
credit, the outcome is not socially optimal.
The consequences of insufficient collateral get worse if the
above assumption is relaxed that all potential investment pro-
jects yield an expected rate of return that is at least equal to
15) Strictly speaking, borrowers who provide full collateral do
not obtain additional funds from their bank; rather they switch
assets with the financial intermediary, receiving a liquid asset
(the credit) in exchange for a less liquid one (the collateral),
and reswitch the assets upon repaying the credit.
16) This may be so for two reasons: (i) the provision of
collateral causes transaction costs and (ii) the collateral may
be worth less to the bank than to the firm.26
the refinancing costs of banks.
17) A rational borrower-investor
compares his benefits from the credit to his costs of default.
These costs consist of
the loss in the investor's collateral,
the loss in any own funds which he has committed to the
project, and
the damage which a default does to his reputation.
The lower these costs, the less self-selection can occur among
applicants for credits: potential borrowers will also seek funds
for projects with an expected rate of return that is below the
opportunity costs of banks or even negative. ' A tiny probabi-
lity of a return on investment that exceeds the costs of
borrowing suffices to make a project look worthwhile for the
potential borrower-investor. In the extreme case, a rational
borrower may not invest at all but simply consume the funds if
the disutility of default does not surpass the utility which he
derives from this consumption.
The less borrowers can be forced to self-select and to use funds
prudently by sorting devices such as collateral, reputation or
the posting of own funds, the more important does it become that
banks can scrutinize loan demands and monitor borrowers. For the
typically undercapitalized firms in the EMEs, the costs of
default are comparatively low for the time being. In order to
attain an allocation of capital that is as rational as in the
West, the financial intermediaries in the EMEs would hence need
to be even better at evaluing credit demands than in developed
17) In a Pareto-efficient equilibrium, the opportunity costs of
banks, i.e. their refinancing costs, should reflect the social
opportunity of the use of capital.
18) More precisely: The lower the costs of default for borrowers,
the more will they seek funds for projects with (i) a high proba-
bility of default at a given expected rate of return (high
variance at a given mean of the probability distribution) or (ii)
a low expected rate of return at a given probability of default
(a low mean at a given variance).27
market economies in which collateral is more readily available
and in which many potential borrowers have to safeguard an
already established reputation.
b. Causes of the collateral
The collateral gap in the EMEs springs from a variety of factors:
many firms are undercapitalised;
as long as property rights problems are not totally resol-
ved, banks cannot know with certainty whether a given asset
can serve as collateral for new debt or not;
- it is unclear whether and to which extent future laws and
court settlements will purport that some of the assets of a
: • firm already secure old debt;
a given collateral is less easy to sell and hence less
useful to a bank than in developed market economies because
of the comparatively high transaction costs in the EMEs;
the uncertainty about the value of collateralizeable assets
is particularly pronounced: the future relative prices in
. the EMEs are highly uncertain anyhow; and even in estab-
lished market economies, the prices for typical kinds of
collateral (real estate) vary procyclically; this problem is
especially acute during the deep transformation crisis in
the EMEs: a potential collateral may or may not be worth
19 ) much less than in a few years; '
Unfortunately, younger and growing enterprises are more likely to
be constrained by a lack of collateral than larger and mature
firms with more collaterizeable assets (Hubbard 1990, p. 5). This
makes the collateral problem even more acute for the EMEs. Given
the dismal state of many existing enterprises, start-ups will
19) As the markets are still very thin and fragmented at present,
the prices for some kinds of real estate in top locations may
decline once the markets are liberalised and become broader.28
need to play a substantial role in the economic reemergence of
the post-socialist states.
c. Potential remedies
One partial remedy is comparatively straightforward: A comprehen-
sive old debt relief as proposed above would already constitute a
major step towards closing the collateral gap. It would help to
clarify the 'net asset position of firms. The real estate and
other collaterizeable assets which state firm have could then be
used to secure new credits.
A further problem that needs to be dealt with is the pervasive
property rights uncertainty. The legal problems stem from the
facts that
the distribution of property rights among those state firms
that used to be subunits of a conglomerate may still be
unclear, and
- that some assets may have to be given back to previous
disposessed owners.
The uncertainty about the fate of the real assets cannot be
eliminated comprehensively within a few months. Once appropriate
laws are passed, it still takes considerable time until legal
disputes are finally settled in court. However, the state could
try to mitigate the adverse consequences of any residual uncer-
tainty. For this purpose, a state agency could be set up to issue
a guarantee that certain assets can in fact serve as collateral.
If the physical asset is later taken away from the firm and given
to somebody else - and if the firm defaults on the credit so that
the bank has to take recourse to the collateral, the state agency
would compensate the bank with long-term government bonds of
corresponding value. The state agency could charge an insurance
20) premium for offering such a guarantee. ' Because the insurance
20) A comprehensive (or near-comprehensive) private insurance is
Forts. Fu£note29
is needed to compensate the failure of the state to sort out
property rights problems immediately, a state subsidy to this
insurance scheme is justified. '
d. A case for temporary credit subsidies?
Given the high degree of overall uncertainty and the collateral
gap in the EMEs, thoroughly restructured and privatised banks are
likely to be'rather cautious lenders. Credit subsidies may appear
to be a warranted compensation for the remaining capital market
shortcomings. However, a credit subsidy resolves neither the
problems of asymmetric information nor .of moral hazard directly:
it does not provide firms with additional collateral (or own
investible funds or a reputation for that matter). State support
for financial intermediation could only induce banks to increase
lending nonetheless.
To assess the potential merits of transitory credit subsidies,
remember that the collateral gap causes two distinct problems:
banks may rationally ration low-interest credit to deter
high risk-borrowers from applying for these funds, and
banks may demand a spread between their costs of refinancing
and their lending rate which crowds out marginal borrowers
Forts. Fu^note
unlikely to emerge spontaneously in the market for the time
being. The property rights risk is partly systematic, it depends
on future legislation and on how courts interprete the relevant
laws. Actions of the state directly impinge upon the resolution
of property rights disputes (Schmieding and Koop 1991).
21) The costs of any scheme to support financial intermediation
in the EMEs would have to be financed via taxes, preferably the
value-added tax. To some extent, such a scheme may be self-
financing: if it succeeds and contributes to real economic
restructuring and hence to economic growth, it widens the tax
base. Furthermore, the benefits which state firms derive from
easier access to credits add to the value of the firm and hence
to the privatisation revenue of the state. This however holds
only if these benefits are hot consumed prior to privatisation
via higher factor remunerations or a slow down in the restruc-
turing process.30
who seek to finance investment projects with an expected
rate of return that is above the opportunity costs of banks
but below the interest rate charged to borrowers.
In the credit-rationing model outlined above, the socially
inefficient rationing serves to deter high-risk borrowers from
masquerading as low-risk ones if low-risk borrowers cannot post
sufficient collateral. A general credit subsidy would not solve
this problem because the subsidy does not systematically change
the relative attractiveness of the various types of credit
contracts for potential borrowers. If both the high-interest/no-
collateral and the low-interest/some-c'ollateral type of credit
become cheaper, high-risk borrowers still have the same incentive
to apply for the low-interest funds. The need for rationing the
22 ^ low-interest credits persists. ' - •-.
The crowding-in effects of a credit subsidy are obvious. All
measures that serve to reduce the lending rate of banks alter the
cost-benefit calculations of potential borrowers: the benefits of
a successful credit-financed investment increase relative to the
(unaltered) costs of default. Marginal borrowers who otherwise
would not have applied for credit at the unsubsidized interest
rates are crowded in. The overall demand for funds increases.
The nature of the subsidy-induced changes in the pattern of
credit depends on the policy instruments chosen. An interest rate
subsidy creates a uniform wedge between the costs of lending for
the bank and of borrowing for the investor. However, the same
22) However, a credit subsidy that is targeted exclusively to the
high-risk borrowers could indeed induce a more efficient alloca-
tion of capital (Gale 1990). Such a subsidy would make it less
attractive for the high-risk group of potential investors to
apply for the low-interest credits that are geared towards the
low-risk borrowers. Inspite of the constrained amount of colla-
teral which low-risk borrowers can offer, banks could therefore
relax the rationing of the low-interest credits. A differentiated
credit subsidy which is inversely related to the collateral
provided would be particularly difficult to administer though.31
comparable incentive to step up overall lending could be attained
if the central bank eased the refinancing conditions for commer-
cial banks. The costs to the state purse would show up in a
corresponding reduction in the profit of the central bank. On the
macroeconomic level, an interest rate subsidy that succeeds to
raise the overall level of credit is tantamount to a more expan-
sionary monetary policy. Ceteris paribus, the net effect of a
comprehensive interest rate subsidy would be more nominal demand
and inflation, not a more efficient allocation of financial
funds. Hence, this option should be discarded completely.
A state-supported credit insurance reduces the variance of the
credit risk to banks as the insurer bears a fixed share in any
23 ) loss on the credit.
 ; Unlike an interest rate subsidy, the
partial insurance directly counteracts risk aversion on the part
of the banks. It also promotes projects that banks deem risky
relative to less risky ones: At the same expected rate of return
on investment, the proportional reduction in the variance matters
most for projects with the highest variance (the most risky
ones).
Any comprehensive scheme of loan insurance would have to be
accompanied by a tightening of monetary policy to keep the
overall ratio of nominal demand relative to real supply at the
desired level. The major effect of such an insurance is not to
increase the overall amount of credit in the economy (a suitable
monetary policy could steer nominal demand to roughly the desired
level) but to change the composition of credit in favour of
borrowers with comparatively risky projects. On the fragmented
and underdeveloped capital market of the EMEs, the banks which
are still comparatively small are likely to be particularly risk
averse, at least once they are privately owned. Furthermore,
23) This argument presupposes that banks have some information
(or at least some rudimentary guesses) on the riskiness of
investment projects. Otherwise, the variance of the probability
distribution of the rate of return on investment would be
infinite for the banks.32
investment risks in the EMEs are more pronounced than usually
(probability distribution of the rate of return on individual
projects exhibits a comparatively high variance at a given mean).
In this situation, a partial loan insurance would serve to
insulate banks to some extent against the peculiar risk charac-
teristics in the EMEs. '
A loan insurance has one major drawback: it gives rise to a moral
hazard on the part of the banks because it makes it less impera-
tive for the banks to evalue and monitor borrowers. Hence, any
subsidized credit insurance should provide only a partial cover
for the credit risk of banks so that a bank which intends to
safeguard its own capital still has a. strong incentive to care-
fully screen credit applications. For the same reason, such
schemes should only apply to banks that are already private, not
to state banks which lack a proper "advocate of capital" (to
borrow a term from Winiecki 1991b).
As long as a private loan insurance is not yet available on the
underdeveloped capital market or as long as an actuarially
efficient insurance premium would crowd out a substantial part of
low-risk investors (adverse selection under conditions of grossly
insufficient collateral), a state-supported insurance can be
warranted economically. After the transformation and privatisa^'
tion of the banking system, a state agency could offer to insure
a certain percentage of each credit (at most 50 per cent) disbur-
sed by private banks. In each case of default, the insurer, i.e.
the state, and the bank would have to bear the loss together. The
percentage of each credit which can be insured in this way is
stepwise reduced to zero over the course of, say, five years. The
major problems of ownership transformation and property rights
uncertainty should be resolved by then. The insureable percentage
24) Sure enough, to the extent that any scheme eventually
succeeds in improving the allocation of capital, it contributes
to the expansion of aggregate supply and hence warrants a
corresponding increase in nominal demand.33
of each credit is not differentiated among branches; however, it
is inversely related to the duration of the credit: debt service
and repayments due after, say, five years are not covered. The
rate of credit default and hence the actuarially efficient
insurance premium cannot be determined ex ante. As a rule of
thumb, the premium could be set slightly above the credit default
rates during recessions in Western economies. Banks whose credits
have an above (below) average incidence of defaults should be
charged above (below) average insurance premiums in the following
year (or get a correspondigly differentiated refund of an in-
surance premium that was deliberately set above the expected
average rate of default).
To sum up, the case for state support for financial intermedia-
tion in the EMEs is weak. A comprehensive interest rate subsidy
would merely be inflationary. Instead, a subsidized insurance
against property-rights risks is warranted. To some extent, a
temporary and limited credit insurance could also mitigate some
of the specific capital market problems in the EMEs. Sure enough,
these second-best proposals are merely temporary and imperfect
stop-gaps. Even if these proposals were implemented, the adverse
consequences of the collateral gap would not vanish completely
for the time being. The major task for the state is to create
conditions under which the rudimentary capital market can mature
quickly.
5. Financial Reform in the Sequencing of the Transformation
Some aspects of the proposals advanced in this paper, notably the
need for a recapitalization of banks and the general desirability
of a sophisticated financial system, reflect a consensus view
among most economists dealing with the subject. Nonetheless, the
major thrust of the radical approach goes against the grain of
what many other authors propose. The majority view is exemplified
by the Socialist Economies Unit of the World Bank: "fully libera-
lized financial markets and privatized intermediaries operating
under tight budget constraints probably come late, rather than
early, in the reform agenda ... the restructuring of loan34
portfolios and recapitalization of banks cannot be finalized
prior to reforms in the productive sector and adjustment to major
shocks (such as the end of the CMEA system" (World Bank 1991,
Annex 4, pp. 1, 4). The arguments presented in this paper boil
down to a case for a transformation of the financial sector that
is much more rapid and precedes the necessarily time-consuming
restructuring and the real economic adjustment of most other
sectors.
On the most fundamental level, the case for giving priority to
financial transformation rests on an assesssment of the different
role which various sectors play in the economy. A delayed adjust-
ment of, say, the steel industry harms only that industry and its
local suppliers; it has little repercussions on the rest of the
economy; the gap in steel output can be closed by imports from
abroad after some devaluation in the exchange rate. A rudimentary
state of financial intermediation and a haphazard pattern of
credit distribution however harm almost all other economic
activities. The success of the entire transformation process
depends more on a rational allocation of financial resources in
the economy as a whole than on the restructuring of a selected
industry. A major part of the problems which make the privatisa-
tion and restructuring of the production sector so arduous stems
from the very fact that financial intermediation is deficient. As
it is impossible to do everything at once with the limited
administrative resources at hand, choices on sequencing have to
be made anyhow. Priority should hence be given to those trans-
25) action-activities ' like banking which are most vital for the
development of capitalism.
On a more practical level, it is true that under present circum-
stances the restructuring of banks is integrally linked to the
restructuring of the enterprises (World Bank 1991, p. 29). As has
been stressed above, this does indeed apply to financial
25) I owe the terminological distinction between the production
and the transaction sector to Wallis and North (1986).35
restructuring: the inherited links between firms and banks need
to be cut, the books of both banks and firms need to be cleaned
of old debt. It does not apply to the real economic adjustment of
firms though. Quite to the contrary: the ex-arite establishment of
an efficient, privately owned banking system with a hard budget
constraint, with access to the world capital market and a sub-
stantial element of foreign involvement facilitates the process
of real economic adjustment. It increases the pressure on those
unviable firms which would otherwise have enjoyed a soft budget
constraint by courtesy of their old ties to the state-owned
banks; and the more rational allocation of domestic funds plus
the improved access to external funds enhance the credit oppor-
tunities for the more promising ventures.
Sure enough, private banks, be they thoroughly restructured and
privatised old ones or newly established ones, may be cautious
lenders, as they were in East Germany in the aftermath of curren-
cy union. ' However, cautious lending is preferable to the
further misallocation of scarce investible funds which is the
hallmark of the present state of financial intermediation.
Furthermore, note that caution reflects both genuine uncertainty
and risk-aversion on the part of financial intermediaries. While
little can be done against the comparatively high degree of
uncertainty which the transformation process entails, the radical
proposal for immediate financial liberalisation helps to mitigate
the element of risk aversion: (i) The larger a bank, the better
can it pool risks. Hence, large foreign banks which enter the
market are likely to be less risk-averse than the small local
ones for whom a few mishaps could already be fatal; and (ii) the
more open the financial market is, the more can venture capital
26) The East German experience is no reliable guide, though. In
East Germany, local wage costs as measured in foreign currency
rose by a factor of roughly six within a few months, causing the
entire production of tradable goods to collapse under competition
from the West. Without a comparable wage explosion, the prospects
for the existing producers of tradable goods in the EMEs are much
brighter; hence, it should be easier for them to get credit once
a well-functioning capital market is established.36
funds from abroad become active in promising but risky activi-
ties .
The standard proposal of linking the restructuring of the banking
system to that of the real economy would imply that the intro-
duction of financial rationality is delayed until the real
economy has adjusted to market conditions and to the shock of the
demise of the CMEA. It may be argued that firms need some transi-
tional assistance during the adjustment period. However, simply
continuing an irrational system of credit allocation which
benefits those firms who happen to have strong links with their
banks and which harms more creditworthy firms is not a sensible
way of providing such transitional assistance (the limited merits
of a partial credit insurance have been discussed above). ;..
The recommendation for giving priority to financial transforma-
tion also appears to be at odds with a part of the literature on
the timing and sequencing of structural reforms in developing
countries (for a survey see Edwards 19 89, chapter 2). Many
authors have argued that financial liberalisation should follow
rather than precede real economic reforms. Otherwise, an inflow
of foreign capital could magnify the effects of the remaining
distortions in the economy and cause a real appreciation of the
exchange rate which unduly harms the tradable goods sector.
Furthermore, as goods markets clear more slowly than asset
markets, a proper synchronization of financial and goods markets
reforms demands that the goods markets be liberalized first. Note
however that these argument apply to the timing and sequencing of
external liberalisation (trade account and capital account), not
to the establishment of an efficient banking system at home. They
are hence not directly relevant to the problem addressed in this
paper.
Nonetheless, a few aspects of these counterarguments merit some
attention. As almost all markets for goods are already liberali-
sed in the EMEs in the sense of having free prices, internal
financial transformation would to some extent merely serve to
close the gap. Nonetheless, could the contrast between an37
efficient (privately-owned) banking system and a distorted
(state-owned) real economy still magnify the internal distortions
via a misallocation of investible funds? This could indeed be the
case if (i) the deficiencies in the real economy distorted the
relative profitability of firms in a systematic way so that the
wrong firms appeared to be most profitable and hence most
creditworthy and if (ii) the banks would not believe in the
removal of such distortions in the future. However, the far-
reaching liberalisation of domestic prices and foreign trade has
already removed major sources of distortions in the relative
profitability of various branches in the real economy, the major
remaining distortion being the prevalence of state-ownership. If
banks indeed reacted to this distortion and (ceteris paribus)
gave preference to private borrowers, this would even impart a
further welcome impetus to the privatisation process. Ultimately,
consider that the alternative to an efficient financial system in
a still distorted environment would be far worse for the EMEs: It
would not be a faster conversion of the real economy but a slower
change in ownership, a slower restructuring of the real economy
and the continuation of the present financial malpractices.
To some extent, the real-appreciation argument against early
financial liberalisation applies to proposals advanced in this
paper. Although the wholesale institutional transfer of a Western
banking system could in theory be restricted to the EME's domes-
tic financial system, the foreign banks that are invited to enter
the market of the EME are likely to demand easy access to their
home base and hence to the world capital market. Apart from the
transfer of skills, the easy access to financial funds from
abroad is in fact one of the major arguments for - not against -
the wholesale adoption of a well-established Western banking
system.
At present, it seems highly unlikely that the emerging market
economies could turn into such magnets for short-term capital in
the near future that the real exchange rate would appreciate to
such an extent as to cause politically disruptive short-run
adjustment problems for the tradable goods sector. So far, the38
EMEs struggle with exactly the opposite problems, namely the
small trickle of foreign investment and - especially in the case
of Poland, Bulgaria and Hungary - a huge external debt. Suppose
nonetheless that excessive capital inflows would really consti-
tute a temporary problem, in this case a temporary and uniform
tax on short-term capital inflows (being progressively reduced to
zero over the course of time) would be the superior remedy. It
distorts the allocation of capital much less than the maintenance
of the present financial irrationalities.
All in all, the case against giving priority to the financial
aspects of the transition to a market economy remains unconvin-
cing. Given the pivotal role which a sound financial system plays
for the development of capitalism, an early and radical transfor-
mation of the financial system, notably a write-off of old debt
and a wholesale institutional transfer from the West, could
considerably facilitate the adjustment process in Europe's
emerging market economies.39
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